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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the determinants of bank holdings of domestic sovereign debt with a
panel dataset of 295 banks in 35 countries between 2002 and 2013. The findings indicate that
the structure of bank ownership (domestic, foreign, or government ownership), the quality of
governance, and the level of financial development of the countries in which banks operate all
determine the level of home bias. Specifically, we find that domestic banks tend to hold more
domestic sovereign debt relative to their foreign counterparts. We also provide evidence that
home bias is even stronger when the domestic bank is controlled by its government.Moreover,
home bias increases when government bonds are more risky, home governments are less
effective, and when banking systems are less financially developed. Overall, we find that
banks’ home bias in holding sovereign debt is an international phenomenon that is determined
by both bank- and country-specific factors.
Keywords Sovereign debt . Home bias .Moral suasion . Government ownership
JEL classification G11 . G21
1 Introduction
The sovereign debt crisis erupted in Europe after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. This crisis
has ignited research interest in the behavior of sovereign debt holders. A major concern during
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the Eurozone crisis was the negative feedback loop between the credit risk of sovereign debt
and banks. Recent EU-wide stress tests have provided bank-level data for researchers to study
sovereign debt holdings.1 The research has shown that European banks have a significant
home bias in their holdings of sovereign bonds. In this paper we explore whether home bias
applies only to European banks or is an international phenomenon despite the many legal,
regulatory, ownership, and cultural differences that exist between banks as well as across
countries. In particular, we seek to answer the following questions: Are banks owned by
foreign entities less prone to home bias in their bond holdings? Does government ownership of
banks affect the holdings of domestic sovereign debt? Do government-owned banks tend to
buy more domestic sovereign bonds when credit conditions deteriorate? Does a country’s level
of financial system development, governance, and control over corruption affect the banks’
holdings of domestic sovereign debt? Is the home bias in European banks a unique phenom-
enon or can we observe it internationally?
One of the reasons for the vicious circle between the credit risks of sovereign debt and
banks in Eurozone countries is the large proportion of domestic sovereign debt that the banks
hold. Sizable sovereign debt holdings can hurt capital adequacy and compromise banks’
ability to efficiently allocate funds to worthwhile projects during a sovereign debt crisis.2 This
inability could hinder economic activity when it is most needed, as was recently the case with
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
There are various transmission channels through which the credit risk of domestic sover-
eign debt can affect banking stability. First, the deterioration in creditworthiness of domestic
bonds damages the bank’s balance sheet and capital adequacy by decreasing the value of
assets. Second, the increased risk of sovereign debt reduces the value of the collateral that
banks can use to raise funding from the interbank market or the central bank. Third, it has a
negative impact on the funding costs of banks that benefit from either implicit or explicit
government guarantees.
The interests of banks and the government are not necessarily contradictory, as they can
extract mutual benefits from each other in the case of collusion. Collusion is more pronounced
in the case of government-owned banks. Less pronounced collusion occurs between
government-owned and private domestic banks, and no collusion exists between foreign banks
and the home government. The degree of collusion can also be differentiated according to the
institutional environment of the country in which banks operate. Significant collusion should
not occur in countries with credible governments and considerable shareholder protection
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In our empirical analysis, we investigate whether home bias and
ownership structure are related, since governments can use moral suasion to ensure that banks,
especially domestic banks, participate in new issues of sovereign bonds. In light of the above
discussion, home bias should be even stronger in government-owned banks.
In terms of measuring the home bias in a bank’s asset holdings, one proxy is the proportion
of domestic sovereign bonds held in the bank’s portfolio. Basic rules of diversification argue
that bond holdings should be diversified across issuers and countries. However, the increased
exposure of banks’ to domestic sovereign bonds may happen for regulatory or risk-shifting
reasons. For example, legislation in the European Union allows European banks to assign
1 See Horváth et al. (2015) and De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016).
2 Furthermore, a country’s excessive sovereign debt may seriously hurt banks’ ability to meet capital require-
ments in cases where the country is on the brink of bankruptcy. This was the case for Greek banks that lost more
than 30 billion euros when the Private Sector Involvement program initiated in 2012 led to a haircut of 53.5% of
the face value of the Greek bonds held.
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zero-risk weights to the sovereign debt issued by any EU member country (see Kirschenmann
et al. (2017) for the regulatory treatment of sovereign bond holdings in the EU). Therefore,
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds may be more attractive for banks since they make
capital requirements easier to meet. Another explanation of home bias in banks’ assets is the
risk-shifting hypothesis. This hypothesis argues that an increased exposure to domestic
sovereign bonds may occur if equity holders wish to shift risk to bank creditors, since in the
event of a sovereign default, a bank is likely to default anyway. Risk-shifting is more likely to
be observed in less capitalized banks.3
A number of recent studies examine the determinants of domestic sovereign bond holdings in
the context of the bank-sovereign nexus in the Eurozone by using bank-level data. Acharya et al.
(2015) provide a theoretical model for the feedback loop between the credit risks of sovereign
debt and banks. They use data on bank sovereign holdings from the Eurozone stress tests
announced in 2010 to find a substantial home bias in banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign
bonds. Approximately 70% of these holdings were invested in domestic sovereign bonds.
Ongena et al. (2018) use proprietary data on monthly security holdings of Eurozone based banks.
They find that during the debt crisis of 2010–2012, domestic banks in stressed countries,
especially government-owned or supported banks, increased their domestic sovereign bond
holdings significantly more than their foreign counterparts. Horváth et al. (2015) use data on
banks’ holdings of sovereign debt from the EU-wide stress tests conducted annually during the
years 2010–2013. Their empirical analysis shows that many European banks have a home bias
and hold significant amounts of domestic sovereign debt. They find that home bias in banks is
more significant if the government has positive ownership, sovereign debt is risky, and
shareholder rights are strong. De Marco and Macchiavelli (2016) also use data from the EU-
wide stress tests and find that government-owned banks or those with politicians on the board of
directors display greater home bias. Becker and Ivashina (2017) also find that government
ownership and government influence through banks’ boards of directors are positively related
to Eurozone banks’ bias for domestic sovereign debt. Kirschenmann et al. (2017) argue that a
sovereign-bank feedback loop can also emerge in safe countries that belong to a group of
financially integrated economies. They describe a subtle mechanism whereby banks in safe
countries buy non-domestic sovereign bonds issued by riskier countries in the same group. In
doing so, banks implicitly take onmore credit risk without impairing their capital adequacy ratios.
This is because regulatory rules allow banks to assign zero-risk weights to these purchases. The
authors use data from Eurozone banks and, consistent with their hypothesis, find significant
spillover effects from risky peripheral countries to safer core countries.
In this paper we examine the determinants of banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings
using a unique dataset comprised of 295 banks in 35 countries between 2002 and 2013. We
collect data on these holdings from a variety of sources, such as annual reports, websites,
Bankscope, and EU-wide stress tests.
In contrast to previous studies that focus exclusively on post-2010 holdings data on
Eurozone banks, our study is the first to investigate the determinants of banks’ domestic
sovereign bond holdings by using an extended sample of data from developing and developed
economies that spans a relatively long time period. Our extended sample includes banks from
countries with different levels of financial development and governance that allows us to more
accurately pin down factors that determine both cross-country and cross-bank variations in
domestic sovereign bond holdings.
3 See, for example, Becker and Ivashina (2017).
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In particular, similar to other studies in the literature, we investigate whether banks’
holdings of domestic sovereign bonds occur because of bank-specific factors, such as owner-
ship structure (domestic, foreign, or state ownership). Another contribution is that the country’s
governance as well as the banking sector’s development and capital market conditions are
significant determinants of home bias in banks’ bond holdings.
The empirical results of our study are as follows: Domestic banks tend to hold more
domestic sovereign debt relative to their foreign counterparts. Moreover, we also find that
home bias in sovereign debt holdings is more pronounced when the domestic bank is
controlled by the government. The strength of this relationship, however, is moderated by
the size of the financial sector. Our results regarding ownership structure and home bias are
robust to alternative explanations, such as risk-shifting or regulatory standards. Regarding
institutional and market factors, we find that home bias in sovereign bond holdings is higher in
countries with less developed banking systems and less effective governance. Overall, home
bias is an international phenomenon driven by both bank- and country-specific factors.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In the next section, we postulate and
discuss the main hypotheses tested in the empirical analysis. In Section 3, we describe the
model used in our empirical analysis and provide a description of the various firm-specific and
country-specific factors that can potentially affect the number of holdings of domestic sover-
eign debt. In Section 4, we discuss the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Research Hypotheses
In the empirical analysis, we identify the effect of ownership structure, bank characteristics,
and country characteristics on home bias. To this end, we measure banks’ home bias using the
ratio of domestic sovereign bonds relative to total assets. First, we examine the bias of foreign
banks toward domestic bonds relative to their domestic counterparts, both government and
privately owned.
H1. Foreign banks hold less domestic sovereign debt relative to their domestic
counterparts.
According to our first hypothesis we expect foreign banks to hold fewer domestic sovereign
bonds, because governments’ moral suasion is more likely to be effective with respect to
domestic banks (Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011). In this paper, we use the term moral suasion to
describe a form of financial repression where the government forces banks to buy its bonds,
even if the purchases are not an optimal decision from a portfolio allocation perspective. The
moral suasion can entail explicit threats, such as stricter supervision or limited access to central
bank funding, or implicit threats for unfavorable treatment in future allocations of government
projects. Domestic banks, especially government-owned banks, can be more vulnerable to
pressure from the government. This is an argument already advanced by Romans (1966).
H2. Government-owned banks hold more domestic sovereign bonds relative to domestic
privately owned banks.
With the second hypothesis, we examine if the home bias in domestic banks is related to
whether the bank is privately- or government-owned. Government-owned banks are more
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likely to hold more domestic sovereign debt relative to domestic privately owned banks
because governments have greater sway over them. Apart from the moral suasion, the
government can influence the composition of the bank’s debt portfolio since, as the main
equity holder, it can directly appoint high-level executives.
H3. Government-owned banks tend to buy more domestic sovereign bonds relative to
domestic privately owned banks or foreign banks when credit conditions deteriorate.
This hypothesis predicts that when domestic sovereign bond yields increase, government-
owned banks purchase more of these bonds. This is because the government will first sway
them to increase holdings of sovereign bonds when credit conditions deteriorate in order to
roll-over existing bonds or issue new bonds to finance budget deficits.4 Broner et al. (2014)
develop a model that rationalizes the increase in home bias during crisis periods. The authors
argue that when the risk of sovereign default increases, there is discrimination in favor of
domestic creditors, as they enjoy a higher expected return compared to foreign creditors.
Discrimination arises because domestic creditors are more likely to be compensated in the
event of default or because of regulatory bias and moral suasion.
H4. The home bias in banks’ balance sheets increases in countries that have less
developed banking systems (H4a), less quality governance (H4b), and less control over
corruption (H4c).
Taken together, these hypotheses examine whether banks’ home bias is related to the level of
development of a country’s banking system, its governance quality, and its control over
corruption. We use the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators to measure the quality
of governance and control over corruption, whereas the banking system’s level of development
is captured by its structure and stability as well as its degree of competition. Here we
hypothesize that the moral suasion channel is stronger in countries with less effective
governance, low control over corruption and less developed banking systems.5 Our hypothesis
is also motivated by studies that find that improved banking sector competition and better
institutions have a positive impact on bank efficiency (see Brissimis et al., 2008; Hasan et al.,
2009; Chronopoulos et al., 2013).
Home bias is not necessarily only caused by moral suasion. Inefficient asset allocation
decisions due to home bias may also be caused by the regulatory preferential treatment of
sovereign bonds or by the asymmetric payoff of equity (see Acharya and Steffen, 2015). Since
sovereign debt issued by any EU member country has a zero-risk weight according to EU
legislation, banks in Europe may prefer home sovereign bonds in order to comply more easily
with capital requirements. Moreover, a bank may purchase more home bonds to shift the risk
to its creditors (and to the central banks when bonds are used as collateral for repurchase
agreements), and place a bet on its own survival, since in the event of a government default the
bank is likely to fail anyway. This behavior is often called Brisk-shifting^ or Bgambling for
4 Asonuma et al. (2015) examine home bias using country aggregate data for the banking sector and find that
home bias provides fiscal breathing space but also increases the riskiness of government debt because it delays
fiscal consolidation.
5 In the home bias literature, Gelos and Wie (2005) find that funds invest less in countries with low government
and corporate transparency. Therefore, increased home bias in banks can also be attributed to the lack of demand
for domestic bonds by foreign investors (non-banks).
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resurrection^ (see Uhlig, 2013; Drechsler et al., 2016; Crosignani, 2015). In our empirical
analysis we take into consideration these two alternative channels, which may be the cause of
increased home bias in a bank’s balance sheet.6
3 Model Specification and Data
3.1 The Model
The empirical model we use to study the relation between bank and country factors and the
domestic sovereign debt holdings of banks is as follows:
πi;s;t ¼ πi;s;t−1 þ ∑ Jj¼1bjX Ji;s;t−1 þ ∑Mm¼1bmYms;t−1 þ vi þ ωt þ εi;s;t ð1Þ
where πi, s, t is the domestic sovereign debt held by bank i in country s as a proportion of its
total assets at time t with i = 1, ..., N; t = 1, ...,T; s = 1, ...,S.7 Sovereign debt holdings are likely
to show a tendency to persist over time that reflects a bank’s decision to treat them as either
held-to-maturity or available-for-sale investments. In order to account for this likelihood, we
adopt a dynamic specification for the model by including a lagged dependent variable, the ratio
of domestic sovereign debt to total assets, among the regressors. The dependent variable, πi, s, t,
is also regressed on bank-specific variables Xj (with j = 1, ..., J) observed at the bank-year level,
and country characteristics Ym (with m = 1, …, M) observed at the country-year level. The
model also includes time dummies, ωt, to capture time effects common to all banks as well as
bank-specific fixed effects, vi, to control for unobserved heterogeneity. εi, s, t is a stochastic
error term.
In our analysis, we fit Eq. (1) to the data by using the two-step system Generalised Method
of Moments (GMM) with robust standard errors that are corrected with the method according
to Windmeijer (2005). The system GMM reduces the potential biases in finite samples and the
asymptotic imprecision associated with the difference estimator (Blundell and Bond 1998). We
also use one-year lags of all independent variables to mitigate any other potential endogeneity
concerns between the dependent variable and its determinant factors.
The consistency of the system GMM depends on both the validity of the assumption that
the error term is not autocorrelated and on the validity of the instruments. Three specification
tests are therefore reported. The first is a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions that
examines the validity of the instruments by analyzing the sample analogue of the moment
conditions used in the estimation procedure. The other two tests examine the hypotheses of no
first-order or second-order autocorrelation in the error term, respectively.
6 Note that our empirical analysis does not allow us to distinguish empirically between moral suasion and
Bfamiliarity^ driven by superior information acquisition by domestic investors (see Coval and Moskowitz, 1999;
Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp, 2009). This is in an interesting topic for future research.
7 We measure banks’ home bias using the ratio of domestic sovereign bonds relative to total assets. Studies that
examine home bias in Eurozone banks also calculate home bias using a CAPM equilibrium approach. Home bias
is measured as one minus the ratio of the share of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio allocated to foreign EU
countries to the share of foreign EU country sovereign debt in all EU sovereign debt held by banks (see, e.g., De
Marco and Macchiavelli 2016). We are not able to calculate this measure because typical balance sheets do not
provide a detailed breakdown of a bank’s government debt portfolio. A detailed breakdown of banks’ govern-
ment debt portfolios in the Eurozone was made publicly available for the purposes of the EU-wide stress tests.
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3.2 Bank- and Country-Specific Factors
Following Berger et al. (2005), we refer to the different types of bank ownership, namely,
domestic, foreign, or government ownership, as forms of Bgovernance^. In order to control for
the effect of a bank’s governance on its domestic sovereign debt, we include the dummy
variable Foreign bank that equals one if the ultimate owner is foreign, and zero otherwise; and
the dummy variable Domestic bank that equals one if the ultimate owner is domestic and not
the government, and zero otherwise. Information on foreign bank ownership is obtained from
the database of Claessens and van Horen (2015), whereas information on government
ownership is from the Bankscope database. Bankscope offers only a snapshot of ownership
data for the most recent year. Therefore, we account for changes in the ownership structure for
each bank over time using data from earlier editions of the Bankscope database that match the
years considered in our study, as in Lensink et al. (2008). The variable for the log of total assets
(Size) is used to control for the effect of the bank’s size on its percentage of domestic sovereign
debt.8 Moreover, we use the ratio of equity to assets (E/TA) to control for a bank’s leverage.
The ratio of loans to total assets (Loans/Assets) represents the relative importance of lending to
the bank’s activity. Finally, we include the dummy variable EU that equals one if a bank
operates in a European Union member state, and zero otherwise.
The country-specific characteristics include a wide set of structural, institutional, and
macroeconomic variables. First, we use the yield of a government bond with a 10-year
maturity (Sovereign debt yield) that comes from Datastream as a proxy for the riskiness of
the domestic sovereign bonds held by banks. In addition, we include the debt to GDP ratio
(Debt/GDP) to capture the condition of each country’s public finances. This variable is drawn
from the IMF’s IFS database. GDP growth comes from the World Development Indicators and
measures the economic growth of a country. We also use indices regarding the characteristics
of the countries’ financial system from the Global Financial Development Database provided
by the World Bank (see Čihák et al. 2012). From this database we use Market concentration
that we define as the percentage of total assets held by the five largest banks in the market as a
summary measure of the industry’s structure. The Boone indicator and the Z-score are also
included in the regression to control for the degree of competition and the stability of the
banking system, respectively. The Boone indicator is calculated as the elasticity of profits to
marginal costs. As the Boone indicator becomes more negative, it indicates increased compe-
tition in the banking sector. Similarly, the Z-score is calculated at the banking sector level as a
weighted average of all banks’ distance to default; hence, a high Z-score indicates a low
probability of insolvency among entities in the banking sector.
We also control for institutional differences across countries using two indicators drawn
from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators as documented in Kaufmann et al.
(2009). These indicators capture different aspects of a country’s governance framework,
namely (i) Government Effectiveness, and (ii) Control over Corruption. Government Effec-
tiveness is an index that captures perceptions of the quality of public services and the quality of
the civil service and its degree of independence from political pressures. Further, it captures the
quality of the formulation and implementation of policy, and the credibility of the govern-
ment’s commitment to such policies. On the other hand, Control over Corruption is an index
that captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain as
8 We use the prevailing end of year foreign exchange rate as sourced from Bankscope to express banks’ total
assets in millions of US dollars.
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well as the degree to which elites and private interests influence the government. The values
that both Government Effectiveness and Control over Corruption can take on by construction
range between −2.5 and 2.5. Table 1 provides definitions and data sources for the bank- and
country-specific variables used for estimating Eq. (1).
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our analysis is based on data from 295 banks in 35 countries between 2002 and 2013. Our sample
is primarily driven by the availability of data on bank holdings of domestic debt issued by central
or local governments. These data are collected from the Bankscope database (using the raw data
model of Fitch-Ratings), annual reports, company websites, and EU-wide stress tests conducted
in 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013.9 However, a number of countries (including Argentina, China,
Mexico and the US) do not have available data on domestic sovereign debt holdings (either
because they are reported combined with debt issued by domestic government-sponsored
corporations or with debt issued by foreign governments) and are excluded from the sample.
This exclusion somewhat limits our ability to generalize our findings. The distribution of banks
across the countries included in the sample is depicted in Table 2, whereas Table 3 reports the
summary statistics of the variables in the empirical analysis.
The average ratio of domestic sovereign debt to total assets is 12.1%. Regarding ownership
structure, 27.2% of the banks are classified as foreign-owned, 18.9% as government-owned,
and 53.7% as domestic. Institutional quality factors are in the range of 0.7 to 0.9, and the
average 10-year bond yield is 5.0%. The average equity to total assets is 8.3%, and the average




This section presents the results of our main empirical analysis. We regress banks’ domestic
government debt holdings scaled by their total assets on one-period lagged values of that ratio; a
set of bank governance indicators; and a set of bank, industry, and macroeconomic covariates.
Table 4 presents results from the estimation of Eq. (1) with alternative estimators. In
columns 1 and 2, we present the estimates of Eq. (1) (excluding market and country
institutional variables) with a pooled OLS and fixed effects estimators, respectively. Bond
(2002) argues that in dynamic relationships these estimators are both biased and inconsistent.
Furthermore, Baltagi (2008) find that a pooled OLS produces upward biased estimates of the
coefficient for the lagged dependent variable, while Nickell (1981) shows that a fixed effects
estimator is downward biased (Nickell, 1981). However, their use provides us with an interval
9 Bankscope contains data on balance sheets and income statements as generated by local accounting practices
for a large number of banks worldwide. One of the attractive features of Bankscope is that it provides that
information in a format that can be comparable across different countries. Nevertheless, for the purpose of our
study, we use the information generated by local accounting practices. Specifically, we draw information on
banks’ domestic sovereign bond holdings for those countries where data is available due to their local accounting
practices. For the construction of our dependent variable, we only use information on domestic sovereign bonds
issued by the central and local governments of each country.
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of values within which the true parameter of the lagged dependent variable lies. As such, these
estimates serve to check on the consistency of the system GMM, our preferred estimator in this
setting (Bond, 2002). Column 3 shows that the estimate of the coefficient for the lagged
Table 1 Variable definitions and data sources









EU-wide stress tests con-
ducted in 2010, 2011,
2012 and 2013
Bank characteristics
Size Log of total assets in millions of US
dollars
Bankscope
E/TA Equity over total assets Bankscope
Loans/Assets Loans over total assets Bankscope
Main explanatory variables
Foreign Bank Dummy variable that equals one if a
bank’s ultimate owner is foreign,
and zero otherwise.
Claessens and van Horen
(2015)
Domestic Bank Dummy variable that equals one if a
bank’s ultimate owner is private and




10-year government bond yield Datastream
Debt/GDP General government gross debt as a
percentage of GDP
IMF




Percentage of total assets held by the
five largest banks in the market.
Global Financial
Development Indicators
Boone indicator A measure of degree of competition,




Z-score A measure of the stability of the






An index capturing perceptions of the
quality of public services, the
quality of the civil service, and the
degree of its independence from
political pressure; the quality of
policy formulation and
implementation; and the credibility






An index capturing perceptions of the
extent to which public power is
exercised for private gain that
includes both petty and large-scale
forms of corruption as well as




EU Dummy variable that equals one if the
bank operates in a European Union
member state, and zero otherwise
Bankscope
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dependent variable using system GMM lies in the interval (0.322, 0.804) provided by the OLS
and fixed effects estimates, and its magnitude (0.748) indicates that banks’ domestic sovereign
debt holdings are quite persistent. Moreover, the consistency of the system GMM is further
confirmed by the Hansen test that shows no evidence of over-identifying restrictions, and the
AR2 test that indicates there is no second-order autocorrelation.
Several conclusions arise from the results in column 3. The parameter estimate of the
variable Foreign bank indicates that foreign banks hold 2.2% less domestic sovereign debt
relative to their domestic counterparts. This finding is in line with hypothesis H1. The size of the
bank is negatively related to the domestic sovereign bond holdings; small banks are more prone
Table 2 This table presents the distribution of banks across the countries included in the sample
Country Number of banks Country Number of banks
Australia 4 Latvia 7
Austria 3 Lithuania 3
Belgium 6 Luxembourg 6
Brazil 5 Malta 5
Bulgaria 3 Netherlands 9
Canada 37 New Zealand 1
Croatia 11 Norway 1
Cyprus 3 Poland 1
Czech Republic 3 Portugal 6
Denmark 4 Russia 9
France 2 Singapore 3
Germany 13 Slovakia 5
Greece 3 Slovenia 5
Hungary 7 South Africa 2
India 67 Spain 9
Ireland 3 Sweden 6
Italy 9 United Kingdom 14
Japan 20
Table 3 This table presents summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. The variables are
defined in Table 1
Variable Level Mean Median Std. Dev. Obs. No. of Countries
Dependent variable
Domestic Sovereign Debt Bank 0.121 0.076 0.129 1740 35
Bank characteristics
Size Bank 16.472 16.231 2.504 1740 35
E/TA Bank 0.083 0.065 0.083 1740 35
Loans/Assets Bank 0.564 0.589 0.191 1727 35
Main explanatory variables
Foreign bank Bank 0.272 0.000 0.445 1740 35
Government-owned bank Bank 0.189 0.000 0.391 1740 35
Domestic bank Bank 0.537 1.000 0.498 1740 35
Sovereign debt yield Country 5.033 4.661 2.415 1653 35
Debt/GDP Country 74.762 71.608 48.435 1693 35
GDP growth Country 3.222 2.949 4.274 1733 35
Market concentration Country 59.780 64.572 27.413 1707 35
Boone indicator Country −0.057 −0.050 0.083 1729 35
Z-score Country 21.529 23.270 11.695 1740 35
Government effectiveness Country 0.829 0.960 0.825 1740 35
Control over corruption Country 0.722 0.810 1.020 1740 35
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to home bias. The estimated coefficient for the bank size variable captures the semi-elasticity of
domestic sovereign bond holdings with respect to the log bank size. According to this estimate a
1% increase in asset size decreases domestic sovereign bond holdings by 0.3 percentage points.
Bank leverage is not statistically and significantly related to domestic sovereign bond holdings.
According to the data, highly leveraged banks do not tend to hold more domestic sovereign
debt, so the risk-shifting hypothesis is probably not a sufficient explanation for the observed
home bias in domestic sovereign bond holdings.
The loan to assets ratio is negatively related to domestic sovereign bond holdings and is
statistically significant at the 5% level. A plausible interpretation of this result is that increased
home bias in domestic sovereign bond holdings is associated with Bcrowding out^ and reduced
financing in the private sector. Banks that hold significant amounts of domestic sovereign debt
may have fewer funds available for the private sector. Becker and Ivashina (2017) also find that
home bias in the Eurozone has led to a significant crowding out of corporate lending.
The statistically significant parameter estimate on sovereign bond yields indicates that
home bias increases, and banks tend to hold more sovereign debt when sovereign bonds
become riskier. This is consistent with our hypothesis that moral suasion and pressure on banks
Table 4 The dependent variable is the ratio of domestic sovereign debt holdings to total assets to measure the
role of foreign ownership. The covariates are defined in Table 1. We estimate Models (1) and (2) using pooled
OLS and fixed effects estimators, respectively, with standard errors clustered at the bank level. Model (3) is
estimated using the two-step system GMM.Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors are given in parentheses
for this model. AR1 and AR2 are the p values of the tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation, respectively.
Hansen is the p value of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions
OLS FE Sys-GMM
(1) (2) (3)
Domestic Sovereign Debt t-1 0.804*** 0.322*** 0.748***
(0.027) (0.079) (0.048)
Foreign bank −0.0032** −0.008* −0.022**
(0.0015) (0.004) (0.009)
Size −0.002*** −0.025* −0.003***
(0.0009) (0.012) (0.001)
E/TA −0.024 −0.089 −0.052
(0.053) (0.099) (0.066)
Loans/Assets −0.021* −0.037 −0.037**
(0.011) (0.027) (0.018)
Sovereign debt yield 0.010*** 0.002 0.015***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
(Sovereign debt yield)2 −0.0005*** −0.0001 −0.0008***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
(Debt/GDP) 0.0003*** 0.0004 0.0004***
(0.00005) (0.0002) (0.00008)
GDP growth 0.001** −0.002 0.0009
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.0007)
EU 0.007 0.085 0.007
(0.004) (0.063) (0.004)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Number of Observations 1217 1217 1217




*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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to participate in new issues of sovereign bonds becomes more intense when conditions
deteriorate in the bond market, and governments find it difficult to attract funding from foreign
investors. However, the negative sign on the squared bond yields shows that the relationship is
concave, and domestic sovereign bond holdings increase at a declining rate as conditions
deteriorate in the government bond market.
Domestic sovereign bond holdings are also positively related to the Debt/GDP ratio. In
other words, banks in highly indebted countries tend to hold more domestic sovereign bonds.
This result is consistent with the observed bank-sovereign nexus phenomenon, where a
negative economic outlook in highly indebted countries and a drop in government bond
values can cause significant losses in bank holdings and trigger a negative feedback loop
between the credit risks of sovereign debt and banks. The coefficient for EU is insignificant in
all specifications under consideration. We interpret this result as evidence that European banks
do not hold significantly more domestic sovereign bonds due to the preferential treatment of
sovereign debt in the EU as compared to banks in other countries.
In column 1 of Table 5, we repeat the previous analysis by further separating domestic
banks into government-owned and privately owned banks and by relying on the system GMM.
To this end, we augment Eq. (1) with Domestic bank.10 We find that home bias is more
prevalent in government-owned banks relative to privately owned banks, but even more so
compared to foreign banks. Specifically, domestic privately owned banks hold 2.8% less
domestic sovereign bonds relative to government-owned banks (the coefficient for Domestic
bank is −0.028), whereas the difference jumps to 4.6% when comparing foreign banks with
government-owned banks (the coefficient for Foreign bank is −0.046). This finding is
consistent with hypothesis H2 regarding the impact of ownership structure and the effect of
moral suasion on domestic sovereign bond holdings. The size and significance of the coeffi-
cients with respect to the other explanatory variables are largely in line with those reported in
column 3 of Table 4.
We also investigate whether the different types of ownership structure can affect banks’
domestic sovereign bond holdings differently for different levels of a country’s risk. To this
end, column 2 of Table 5 presents the estimates of a model specification that takes into
consideration the interaction between ownership structure and sovereign risk. Both interactive
terms between Sovereign bond yields and Domestic bank and Foreign bank have negative and
statistically significant coefficients at the 5% and 10% level, respectively. These results show
that both privately owned domestic banks and foreign banks decrease, on average, their
domestic sovereign bond holdings when their yields increase, which confirms hypothesis H3.
Columns 3 to 5 of Table 5, respectively, test our hypotheses H4a-H4c by introducing banking
sector and country institutional variables into the analysis. Indeed, the effect of ownership
remains robust in these specifications. The positive coefficient for the Z-score indicates that
holdings of domestic sovereign debt are higher when the banking system is more stable, while
home bias decreases as competition in the market increases (Boone indicator). Taken together,
these findings lend partial support to hypothesis H4a, that home bias in banks’ balance sheets
increases in countries that have less developed banking systems. On the other hand, domestic
sovereign bond holdings are negatively related to levels of both government effectiveness
(column 4) and control over corruption (column 5). These findings, respectively, are in line
with our hypotheses H4b and H4c. That is, banks that operate in countries whose institutional
10 We omit the dummy variable that identifies government-owned banks from our analysis in order to avoid the
dummy variable trap. In doing so, government-owned banks become the reference category for our analysis.
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qualities (represented by Control over Corruption and Government Effectiveness) are weak are
more likely to hold domestic sovereign bonds on their balance sheets. This is consistent with the
view that governments can exert moral suasion and influence over banks in countries where the
degree of independence from political pressure is low.
Table 5 The dependent variable is the ratio of domestic sovereign debt holdings to total assets to measure the
role of state ownership. The covariates are defined in Table 1. We estimate all regressions using the two-step
systemGMM.Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors are in the parentheses. AR1 and AR2 are the p values
of the tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. Hansen is the p value of the Hansen test of
over-identifying restrictions
Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM Sys-GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic Sovereign Debt t-1 0.712*** 0.708*** 0.714*** 0.688*** 0.690***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) (0.061) (0.057)
Domestic bank −0.028** −0.019* −0.021* −0.023* −0.023*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Domestic bank * Sovereign debt yield −0.009**
(0.004)
Foreign bank −0.046*** −0.031** −0.037** −0.039** −0.039**
(0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Foreign bank * Sovereign debt yield −0.008*
(0.005)
Size −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004*** −0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
E/TA −0.021 −0.018 −0.023 −0.021 −0.022
(0.073) (0.071) (0.070) (0.080) (0.073)
Loans/Assets −0.039* −0.030 −0.030 −0.035 −0.037
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023)
Sovereign debt yield 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
(Sovereign debt yield)2 −0.0007*** −0.0005** −0.0006*** −0.0005 *** −0.0006**
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Debt/GDP 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0003 *** 0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.00009) (0.00009) (0.00006) (0.00009)
GDP growth 0.0009 0.0006 0.0009 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Z-score 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0005* 0.0005*
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Market concentration 0.0001 0.0001 0.00017 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Boone indicator 0.045** 0.043** 0.027 0.033*
(0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019)
Government effectiveness −0.008*
(0.004)
Control over corruption −0.005*
(0.002)
EU 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 1217 1208 1208 1208 1208
Number of Banks 295 293 293 293 293
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.831 0.932 0.805 0.766 0.784
Hansen 0.933 0.626 0.835 0.911 0.949
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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4.2 Sensitivity Checks
In this subsection, we investigate the sensitivity of our inferences to sample selectivity, the
definition of the dependent variable, and the choice of the estimation method. The sensitivity
checks are reported in Tables 6 and 7.
There is substantial evidence that EU banks differentiate their sovereign bond portfolios
based on ownership structure. We therefore examine the impact of sample selectivity on
our inferences, and especially the possibility that our results are driven by the behavior of
EU banks. To account for this possibility, we reestimate our canonical model after adding
an interaction term between the different types of bank ownership and EU. The results are
presented in column 1 of Table 6. The coefficients for the interaction terms of interest are
statistically insignificant and indicate that, on average, EU and non-EU foreign and
domestic privately owned banks behave similarly in terms of domestic sovereign bond
holdings.
In the same spirit, we also examine whether foreign banks from neighboring countries
might have similar investment patterns to domestic banks in the host country. To this end, we
augment Eq. (1) with Contiguous that equals one if the foreign bank is located in a contiguous
neighboring country and has a controlling share, and zero otherwise. We also add its
interaction with Foreign bank.11 If there are spillover effects in banks’ investment patterns
across neighboring countries, we should find a statistically significant coefficient for the
interaction term. Column 2 of Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. The coefficient of
interest is statistically insignificant that indicates the distance between home and host countries
plays no role in the investment patterns of foreign banks.
To provide additional insights, we also examine whether countries with enlarged banking
sectors relative to their economies could be driving our results. That is, in countries that
perform Bspecial roles^ in the global financial system (e.g., Cyprus, Malta, and Luxembourg,
among others) the home bias might be less prevalent. To this end, we reestimate Eq. (1) by
adding Financial sector size that is defined as the ratio of the financial intermediaries’ assets to
gross domestic product, and its interaction with both Domestic bank and Foreign bank.12,13
The results are presented in column 3 of Table 6. Both interaction terms have a negative
coefficient, but only Domestic bank ∗ Financial sector size is statistically significant. This
result means that the relative size of the financial sector plays a moderating role in the home
bias of domestic banks. A plausible explanation for this finding is that moral suasion weakens
in countries with enlarged financial sectors that possibly act as financial centers and aim to
attract funds from foreign investors.
To further investigate the sensitivity of our results to sample selectivity, we examine the
distribution of banks across countries. To ensure that the results are not biased by the over-
representation of some countries in our sample, we reestimate Eq. (1) by weighting the
observations by the inverse of the number of observations for each country. The results, which
are presented in column 4 of Table 6, are consistent with our main findings.
Next, to avoid outliers driving our inferences, we winsorize the dependent variable at the
1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical distribution. The results, reported in column 1 of
11 The results are also robust to the use of the geodesic distance between the capital cities of the host and home
countries of foreign banks.
12 The data are obtained from the Financial Structure Database available from the World Bank.
13 Financial sector size is demeaned to allow for easier interpretation of the interaction terms.
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Table 7, indicate that our inferences are not dependent on outliers. In column 2 of Table 7, we
address the possibility that our results could be influenced by the way the dependent variable is
normalized. To ensure that this is not the case, we reestimate our canonical model using the
ratio of domestic sovereign debt to total other earnings assets, instead of the ratio of domestic
sovereign debt to total assets. Although the sample of banks with other earnings assets is
slightly smaller, our main results on ownership type are unaffected.
Finally, we use two alternative estimation approaches, namely the Tobit model (Tobin
1958) and the factional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge 1996), to assess the robustness of
our inferences towards our estimation method. The results from these two estimators are
reported in the last two columns of Table 7, respectively. The key findings are corroborated, as
we continue to find that foreign-owned banks hold less domestic sovereign bonds than either
domestic privately owned banks or government-owned institutions.
Table 6 In Model (1), we identify whether banks operating in Europe drive our findings. In Model (2), we
identify whether foreign banks from neighboring countries might have similar investment patterns as the
domestic banks in the host country. Model (3), we identify whether countries acting as financial centers influence
our results. In Model (4), the observations are weighted by the inverse of the number of observations of each
country. All models are estimated using the two-step system GMM. Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors
are in the parentheses. AR1 and AR2 are the p-values of the tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation,









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Domestic Sovereign Debt t-1 0.719*** 0.708*** 0.707*** 0.712***
(0.066) (0.055) (0.052) (0.071)
Domestic bank −0.024* −0.022* −0.023* −0.020*
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011)
Domestic bank ∗ EU 0.037
(0.028)




Foreign Bank −0.039** −0.040** −0.033** −0.035**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.014) (0.016)
Foreign bank ∗ EU 0.042
(0.031)
Foreign bank ∗Contiguous −0.233
(0.217)




EU −0.031 0.005 −0.0006 0.007
(0.020) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Contiguous 0.250
(0.215)
Financial sector size 0.00006
(0.00009)
Control variables YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 1208 1208 1208 1208
Number of Banks 293 293 293 293
AR1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
AR2 0.797 0.441 0.655 0.469
Hansen 0.958 0.977 0.995 0.998
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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In sum, we consistently observe a negative effect of foreign and domestic private
ownership on the size of banks’ sovereign bond portfolios relative to government-owned
institutions. These findings lend support to our key hypothesis that the proportion of
banks’ holdings of domestic sovereign bonds can be explained by their ownership
structure, the quality of governance, and the development of the banking system in the
countries in which they operate.
Table 7 In Model (1), we winsorize the dependent variable at the 1st and 99th percentiles of its empirical
distribution. In Model (2), we estimate our canonical model using the ratio of domestic sovereign debt to total
other earnings assets to address the possibility that our results are influenced by the way the dependent variable is
normalized. Both models are estimated using the two-step system GMM. Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard
errors are in the parentheses. In Models (3) and (4), we assess the robustness of our inferences with respect to
using alternative estimators. Specifically, in Model (3) we estimate our canonical model using the Tobit (Tobin,
1958) estimator, whereas in Model (4) we use the fractional logit model (Papke and Wooldridge, 1996). AR1 and
AR2 are the p-values of the tests for first- and second-order autocorrelation, respectively. Hansen is the p value of














Domestic bank −0.014* −0.100** −0.040*** −0.305***
(008) (0.048) (0.007) (.058)
Foreign Bank −0.028** −0.129** −0.054*** −0.327***
(0.012) (0.054) (0.008) (0.081)
Size −0.003** −0.037*** −0.012*** −0.102***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.013)
E/TA −0.047 −0.280 −0.106*** −0.778**
(0.044) (0.162) (0.036) (0.301)
Loans/Assets −0.020 0.005 −0.156*** −1.505***
(0.022) (0.067) (0.014) (0.135)
Sovereign debt yield 0.011*** 0.072*** 0.033*** 0.428***
(0.002) (0.014) (0.004) (0.055)
(Sovereign debt yield)2 −0.0005** −0.003*** −0.001*** −0.022***
(0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.004)
Debt/GDP 0.0003*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.013***
(.00007) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0008)
GDP growth 0.0006 0.010*** 0.007*** 0.069***
(0.0007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.012)
Z-score 0.0003 0.001 0.0008*** 0.009***
(0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.002)
Market concentration 0.00007 0.00007 −0.0004*** −0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001)
Boone indicator 0.036* 0.223* 0.14*** 2.330***
(0.021) (0.117) (0.035) (0.443)
EU 0.006 0.039 −0.002 −0.050
(0.008) (0.029) (0.006) (0.075)
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Number of Observations 1208 1096 1208 1208




*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examine the determinants of domestic sovereign bond holdings by using a panel
data of 295 banks in 35 countries between 2002 and 2013. We hypothesize that decisions on the
allocations of domestic sovereign bonds are affected by the ownership structure of the banks as
well as institutional characteristics. In the empirical analysis we find that government-owned
banks hold more domestic sovereign debt. The effect of the ownership structure is particularly
important when the domestic sovereign bond yields are high. Banks whose ultimate owner is a
foreign entity are less prone to home bias in their bond holdings, and banks that operate in
countries with better institutional environments hold fewer domestic sovereign bonds.
In terms of its contribution to the literature, unlike prior studies, this paper examines the
home bias hypothesis in holding sovereign debt in an international context and beyond the
Eurozone area. We find that the home bias in holding sovereign debt is an international
phenomenon. Indeed, our tests show that banks operating in the EU do not have levels of
home bias that are different from the banks that operate in non-EU countries. The impact of
regulation on home bias and on the sovereign-bank feedback loop is an important topic that is
not fully explored in our analysis. The empirical results in our particular setting show that
regulatory standards do not seem to significantly impact home bias. However, our empirical
analysis does not test for the indirect effects caused by regulatory standards, such as those
described by Kirschenmann et al. (2017).
Overall, our empirical results show that moral suasion is an important determinant of banks’
home bias in holding sovereign bonds. We interpret our results as evidence that governments
can sway banks, especially domestic and government-owned ones, to purchase domestic
sovereign bonds, even if these purchases are not optimal from an asset allocation perspective.
Europe has taken important steps toward moderating the negative feedback loop between bank
debt and sovereign debt with the introduction of the banking union and the establishment of
the Single Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism. The supervision of
systemic banks at the European level and the monitoring of their board members will most
likely weaken governments’ ability to influence banks’ investment decisions with respect to
bond purchases and credit allocation in general.
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